In an article titled ‘How Not to Describe the Awami League’, published in this paper, British journalist David Bergman rightly underscores the importance of accuracy in labeling a political party—particularly when such labels carry potential legal consequences. Those familiar with Bergman’s work over the years know that he has consistently taken on politically sensitive and controversial subjects, often at significant personal and professional cost. His courage and commitment to journalistic integrity deserve recognition.
Bergman is correct in asserting that “while serious criticisms of the Awami League are both valid and necessary, they must be proportionate and grounded in fact.” His analysis focuses primarily on the legal validity and appropriateness of labeling the Awami League as “fascist” or “Nazi.” He argues that comparing the party to the Nazi regime trivialises the scale of Nazi atrocities and misrepresents the complexities of Bangladeshi politics.
Indeed, any historical comparison between the Nazi Party and the Awami League would be an exaggeration. The scale of violence, genocidal policies, and totalitarianism under the Nazis is unmatched. However, describing the Awami League as a fascist party—based on its trajectory and actions within the context of Bangladesh's political history—is not a distortion. On the contrary, it is a term that demands serious consideration.
Let’s examine what defines fascism. According to Merriam-Webster, fascism is:
“A populist political philosophy, movement, or regime (such as that of the Fascisti) that exalts nation and often race above the individual, that is associated with a centralized autocratic government headed by a dictatorial leader, and that is characterized by severe economic and social regimentation and by forcible suppression of opposition.”
The Cambridge Dictionary defines it as:
“A political system based on a very powerful leader, state control, and being extremely proud of (the) country and race, and in which political opposition is not allowed.”
With the exception of racial supremacy, the Awami League—especially under Sheikh Hasina’s leadership—demonstrates most of these traits. It is important to acknowledge that the Awami League of today is not the same party founded by Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The party that once led the struggle for independence has undergone several transformations—dissolving into BAKSAL in 1975 and re-emerging under military rule. Since Sheikh Hasina assumed leadership in 1981, the party has been fundamentally reshaped—ideologically and structurally—into a vehicle for autocratic rule.
Recognizing that fascism today is understood more broadly, the U.S.-based think tank Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) identifies extreme nationalism, cult of personality, and mass mobilization as hallmarks of fascist systems. Has the Awami League not exhibited these traits?
Consider how dissenters have been labeled anti-national, often branded as “Razakars” or agents of Pakistan. The idolisation of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman—evident in the proliferation of his images, statues, and memorials—has fostered a cult of personality around the Sheikh family. The Awami League’s grip on the state apparatus has allowed it to mobilise supporters and suppress opposition with unmatched efficiency.
The CFR also warns that, while classical fascism is historically tied to the interwar period, its characteristics can reappear in modern political contexts. Global democratic backsliding only increases the risk of such authoritarian tendencies resurfacing.
Bergman’s cautious assertion that “elements of the Awami League's conduct may well resemble certain authoritarian traits of a fascist party” but that it is “inaccurate to describe it as one” is problematic. This framing can inadvertently downplay the extent of Sheikh Hasina’s authoritarian control. Party officials, including the general secretary, frequently have openly acknowledged that final decisions rest solely with the party chief. Even her son, Sajeeb Wazed Joy, once admitted that Sheikh Hasina appreciates being portrayed by Western media as an authoritarian leader.
Using the four key indicators of authoritarian behavior identified by Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt in How Democracies Die, one could argue that democracy in Bangladesh has long ceased to function. These indicators are: rejecting democratic rules of the game, denying legitimacy to political opponents, encouraging violence, and curtailing civil liberties. All four apply to Bangladesh’s current political landscape.
That said, Bergman’s concerns about repression, including arbitrary arrests and politically motivated charges, are entirely valid. Justice demands that those responsible for violence—particularly against opposition members and student protesters—be held accountable. However, no one should be persecuted on fabricated or politically expedient charges.
Bergman, like several commentators, seems to conflate a ban on the activities of the Awami League with a ban on the party itself. The official notification only restricts its activities including use of violence, which the interim government considers can influence the judicial process adversely — not the party’s existence. It is akin to placing conditions on a defendant during trial to prevent interference. This distinction matters and must be preserved to avoid further confusion.
In sum, describing the Awami League in precise and historically informed terms is essential for ensuring that political discourse in Bangladesh remains honest and grounded in reality.
(Published in The Daily Star on May 26, 2025.)
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