Two reports concerning Sheikh Hasina—who has been tried in absentia and sentenced to death by Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal for crimes against humanity—have generated considerable political speculation and heated debate in recent weeks. The first concerned a reported request by a British lawyer, claiming to represent her, for the issuance of a Bangladeshi passport and National Identity Card (NID). The second claimed that New Delhi had set two preconditions for sending her back to Dhaka.
The first story emerged following the leak of a letter written by London-based barrister Steven Powles KC to Bangladesh’s Acting High Commissioner in New Delhi. The letter, however, did not explain why Hasina needed a passport and NID, the latter of which reportedly remained locked rather than revoked. Her supporters portrayed the request as further evidence of her determination to return home, come what may. None of her supporters are ready to accept that she also needs a passport to move to a third country, if she chooses to. Some even argued that Dhaka’s subsequent rejection of the idea of issuing her a passport to facilitate her return demonstrated its inability to execute the tribunal’s verdict, and suggested that keeping her away from Bangladesh might, in fact, be the preferred option.
What they fail to explain, however, is what a reasonable conclusion to the official extradition process, initiated in December 2024, would look like. Should Dhaka withdraw its extradition request, which both India and Bangladesh have acknowledged as a major obstacle to normalising bilateral relations? Issues ranging from trade and water sharing to consular matters have remained entangled in the dispute over the ousted prime minister’s future. Her political activities from exile have been characterised as destabilising and subversive by both the interim administration led by Professor Muhammad Yunus and the elected government of Tarique Rahman.
The second report, published by BBC Bangla, was even more intriguing. According to the report, Indian officials have indicated that Bangladesh must arrange for Hasina’s return through its military to ensure her safety and security.
On August 5, 2024, at the height of the mass uprising, Hasina left Dhaka aboard a military transport aircraft bound for New Delhi. India’s External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar, told the Indian parliament on August 6, 2024: “On 5th August, demonstrators converged in Dhaka despite the curfew. Our understanding is that after a meeting with leaders of the security establishment, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina apparently made the decision to resign. At very short notice, she requested approval to come for the moment to India.”
According to Jaishankar’s statement, Hasina had decided to resign and sought permission to travel to New Delhi, which the Indian government granted. The phrase “for the moment” is particularly significant. It suggests that India may not have envisaged her indefinite stay on its soil when it initially agreed to accommodate her.
The second precondition, according to BBC Bangla, is that Bangladesh must guarantee Hasina the opportunity to appeal against her death sentence and ensure a fresh trial concerning the killings during the July uprising. While no government can simply overturn a judicial verdict through an executive order, the possibility of an appeal or other judicial remedy cannot be entirely ruled out. A precedent of sorts has already been set when the Supreme Court granted former Jamaat-e-Islami leader Moulana Abul Kalam Azad, also convicted by the ICT of crimes against humanity, permission to seek a hearing on the admissibility of his long-delayed appeal against the death sentence.
When asked about these reported preconditions, Randhir Jaiswal, a spokesperson for India’s Ministry of External Affairs, neither confirmed nor denied them. Instead, he reiterated that the extradition matter would be handled through established legal channels. Although officials at Bangladesh’s foreign ministry expressed ignorance of any such demands from New Delhi, one cannot help but wonder why Jaiswal avoided directly addressing the question of preconditions.
If India has indeed demanded guarantees concerning Hasina’s security and her right to appeal, could it be interpreted as a signal of its willingness to honour Bangladesh’s extradition request? Indications emerging from diplomatic circles in India also suggest that her continued presence there may soon become less welcome, if it hasn’t already. BBC Bangla further reported that her attempts to relocate to other countries had also been unsuccessful.
Is there another way to resolve the extradition question, such as voluntary return? The answer is yes, but it would require an admission of guilt and an agreement to surrender to the requesting country. Without a guilty plea, withdrawal of an extradition request is unprecedented. One recent example is the case of Julian Assange, the celebrated founder of WikiLeaks, whose organisation published a trove of classified US documents in 2010.
Assange faced multiple charges, including allegations relating to computer hacking and espionage. Following prolonged negotiations, the United States reached a plea agreement with him in June 2024, ending its pursuit of extradition from the United Kingdom. Assange agreed to plead guilty to a single charge under the Espionage Act. He subsequently appeared before a US court in the Northern Mariana Islands, where the agreement was approved. Having been sentenced to time already served, he was allowed to leave as a free man.
Hasina’s case, however, bears a closer resemblance to that of another elected leader turned authoritarian ruler: Peru’s Alberto Fujimori, who was eventually convicted in his own country for crimes against humanity.
Of Japanese descent, Fujimori was initially elected president of Peru. His rule, however, became synonymous with authoritarianism, entrenched corruption, extrajudicial killings and serious human rights violations. He was subsequently found guilty of responsibility for the activities of the clandestine Colina Group, comprising military and security personnel who carried out a series of killings. He fled Peru for Japan in 2000 after controversially securing a third presidential term. The Peruvian Congress removed him from office despite his resignation from abroad. Lima subsequently sought his extradition, but Tokyo refused, recognising his Japanese nationality and citing constitutional and legal obstacles to surrendering him to another country.
After a prolonged diplomatic deadlock, Fujimori, hoping to launch another presidential bid, travelled to Chile, where a friendly conservative government was in power. But Chilean authorities arrested him, and its Supreme Court eventually authorised his extradition to Peru in 2007.
Back in Peru, Fujimori was tried and convicted. The verdict was particularly significant for its treatment of indirect responsibility and the doctrine of authorship by command: a leader could be held criminally responsible for crimes committed by others acting under his orders, even if he had not personally carried them out. In 2017, Fujimori received a presidential pardon, ostensibly as part of a national reconciliation effort. The decision, however, triggered widespread outrage, bringing protesters back onto the streets of Lima. Fujimori’s political movement retained a substantial support base, and his daughter, Keiko Fujimori, in her fourth attempt, got elected as president last June.
In resolving Sheikh Hasina’s extradition issue, few relevant precedents exist other than Fujimori and Assange’s cases, which offer very different pathways: one through extradition and subsequent prosecution in the home country, the other through a negotiated plea agreement and surrender.
Could either provide a way forward for Dhaka and New Delhi? The Fujimori precedent suggests that extradition, even after years of political and diplomatic complications, remains possible. The Assange case demonstrates that a negotiated settlement may also offer an alternative, provided the parties concerned are willing to accept its legal and political implications. The way forward may depend not only on Dhaka and New Delhi’s calculations but also on Sheikh Hasina herself.
(Published in The Daily Star on November 16, 2026)
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