The image of a former Chief Justice, hands cuffed behind his back, clad in a bulletproof vest and helmet, being escorted to court is deeply unsettling. Yet it is no more disturbing than a Chief Justice fleeing his official residence in the wake of a popular uprising, seeking refuge in a military garrison, or being forcibly evicted by plainclothes security agents and exiled from his own country. Alarmingly, Bangladesh has witnessed all of these in the last eight years. It is a tragic chronicle of how the judiciary has been systematically dismantled by an all-too-powerful dictator—Sheikh Hasina.
The repeal of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, which abolished the provision for a non-partisan caretaker government to oversee elections, stands as a pivotal moment in this erosion. It enabled Sheikh Hasina to conduct three consecutive one-sided elections and tighten her grip on power. While the Supreme Court had the jurisdiction to rule on the amendment, the conduct of then Chief Justice A.B.M. Khairul Haque was ethically questionable. His decision to alter the open court’s short order—reflected in the full verdict issued 16 months after retirement—was viewed by many as judicial misconduct, even bordering on forgery or fraud.
Such conduct fell far short of the standards of impartiality and integrity expected of the judiciary, and it significantly undermined public trust. Suspicions persist that the delay in issuing the full verdict was deliberate, affording Sheikh Hasina the opportunity to pass legislation circumventing the short order’s provision facilitating two more elections under the caretaker system. She seized this window and abolished the caretaker provision, ignoring even the recommendations of a parliamentary committee.
More troubling still were allegations that Justice Haque privately sought financial assistance from Prime Minister Hasina’s discretionary relief fund for his wife's medical treatment while petitions against the executive were pending before his bench. At the very least, such an action suggests a serious moral compromise.
Critics also point to his continued appointments as chairman of the Law Commission, a post he held on a contractual basis long after retiring from the Supreme Court. These extensions continued until the end of Hasina’s fall, despite Haque’s own ruling in the 13th Amendment case that judges should not accept “offices of profit” after leaving the bench. In practice, he did just that—serving the very government his judicial actions had benefited.
Justice Haque did, however, fail to secure a judgeship at the International Criminal Court (ICC), despite being nominated by the Hasina regime twice for elections, in 2015 and 2020. His nominations were withdrawn amid strong opposition from human rights organisations and lack of support among member states.
His recent arrest has triggered mixed reactions. The unease felt by some stems from the fact that he has not been charged with any of the alleged offences or judicial misconduct mentioned above, but on a murder charge, which is hardly a credible one. Unfortunately, framing murder charges against those whom the authorities want to be incarcerated seems still a preferred tactic which we all thought would end with the fall of the dictatorship.
Those who have long blamed Justice Haque for enabling Sheikh Hasina to politicise—and ultimately weaponise—the judiciary view his arrest with a sense of vindication. To them, he bears significant responsibility for a system that denied justice to countless opposition figures and, in many cases, actively persecuted them, thereby should be treated as a complicit.
Yet it raises a critical question: why wasn’t he arrested in either of the two cases related to his 13th Amendment verdict—one alleging forgery for deviating from the short order, and another for sedition filed in Narayanganj? Some legal experts suggest the answer lies in judicial immunity, which shields judges for actions taken in the discharge of their duties. However, critics argue that protections under the Judicial Officers’ Protection Act of 1850 should not apply once a judge leaves office—especially if the alleged misconduct occurred while he was a private citizen.
Justice S.K. Sinha, who authored the verdict nullifying the 16th Amendment (which would have made Supreme Court judges accountable to Parliament), described in his own words how he was harassed by the officials of DGFI (Directorate General of the Forces Intelligence) within court premises and eventually forced into exile. His experience, too, serves as a chilling reminder that the subjugation of the judiciary in Bangladesh is not unprecedented. While he had his faults, Sinha was arguably the first and only Chief Justice to be publicly humiliated by the executive while still in office.
Restoring public faith in the judiciary is now more urgent than ever. What Bangladesh needs is a justice system that is truly independent of the executive, operating with transparency, integrity, and fairness—one in which no judge is subjected to disgraceful prosecution, nor forced to flee their homeland.
(Published in The Daily Star on July 30, 2025.)
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