India is now grappling with the delicate task of finding a sanctuary for the ousted Sheikh Hasina, who had long been a steadfast and trusted ally in South Asia. The decision is aimed at preventing further deterioration in its already strained relations with Bangladesh. Meanwhile, the new interim government, led by Nobel laureate Dr. Yunus, seems to be gathering momentum and is poised to reshape the regional political landscape. Once celebrated as an “Iron Lady” for bringing stability—an essential prerequisite for business, whether for democratic or authoritarian powers—Hasina’s dislodgement by a popular uprising now compels every major global player to reassess their strategies.
Hasina’s fall from power has been marked by a violent and disgraceful exit, which resulted in approximately 1,500 deaths, including children. This tragic outcome underscores one of the bloodiest modern-day attempts by any dictator to cling to power. Her efforts crumbled when security chiefs refused to shoot civilians and informed her that the swelling masses of protesters would soon reach her official residence, Gonobhaban. It became evident that the military would not be able to withstand the crowd for long. There had been speculation that India, Hasina’s strongest backer, would intervene, but this intervention never materialised. Ultimately, she was left at the mercy of the same military that had once protected her, which swiftly seized control and arranged for her to be flown across the border.
The sudden collapse of Delhi’s closest regional ally sent shockwaves through the corridors of power in India, where the government took more than 24 hours to issue a formal response. Amid the peak of the unrest, on July 31, just four days before Hasina’s forced resignation, Indian High Commissioner Pranay Verma met with her at Gonobhaban to reaffirm India’s unwavering support for her embattled regime. During this meeting, Hasina reportedly warned that anarchists were attempting to create a Sri Lanka-style collapse, referencing the recent protests against her administration. In response, Verma reassured her of India’s continued backing, stating, “As a close neighbour and partner of Bangladesh, India will always support policies and endeavours that realise the vision of a stable, progressive, and prosperous Bangladesh.” This meeting, while demonstrating India’s steadfast commitment to Hasina, also revealed a critical misjudgment of the ground realities.
In addition to facing the sensitive decision of granting asylum to a disgraced leader, which India had previously refused to do for Sri Lankan leaders, it was forced to arrange the evacuation of thousands of Indian nationals as security concerns in Bangladesh worsened. Before officially confirming temporary shelter for Hasina, India held an all-party meeting—a rare exercise reserved for emergencies with national security implications. Given India’s 4,096.7 km shared land border with Bangladesh, the longest of any neighbouring country, concerns naturally arose over a potential influx of asylum seekers. Similar concerns had emerged after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in a 1975 military coup, which led some Awami League leaders to cross the border and seek refuge in India.
Since returning to power in 2009, Sheikh Hasina had navigated several complex balancing acts in her foreign policy, gaining widespread international praise. Her leadership was particularly challenging due to the geopolitical rivalry between China and India, as both powers sought to expand their influence in the region. However, despite maintaining an appearance of balance, Hasina’s administration gradually leaned toward India, with New Delhi emerging as the greater beneficiary of her rule.
Bilateral relations between India and Bangladesh flourished during Hasina’s tenure, with both countries touting their ties as stronger than ever before. Beneath the surface, however, growing discontent in Bangladesh over India’s perceived ‘exploitative’ relationship was widespread. This frustration reached a boiling point after India’s overt backing of Hasina’s controversial election on January 7, 2024, which backfired and fueled a non-political “India Out” campaign.
India had successfully thwarted China’s attempts to deepen its foothold in Bangladesh, including blocking Beijing’s bid to build a deep-sea port in the Bay of Bengal, despite Bangladesh's earlier decision to induct two Chinese submarines into its navy. Furthermore, China’s attempts to gain access to Chittagong and Mongla, Bangladesh’s two major maritime ports, were also obstructed by India. In contrast, India secured the use of these ports and reportedly gained management rights at Mongla. Under Hasina, Bangladesh agreed to the construction of a network of Indian surveillance radars along its coastline, further cementing India’s influence in the region. Additionally, the two countries moved into new areas of cooperation, including defence procurement, joint weapons production, and collaboration in space programs.
Perhaps the most controversial concession Hasina granted India was the use of a transport corridor across Bangladesh, allowing Indian goods to travel by road, rail, and riverine routes from one part of India to another. While bilateral trade quadrupled during Hasina’s 15-year rule, it remained highly imbalanced, with Indian exports to Bangladesh soaring to $16 billion while Bangladesh's exports to India lagged at just $2 billion. The “India Out” campaign, sparked by social media influencers, reflected the widespread dissatisfaction with this trade imbalance and India's support for Hasina’s increasingly authoritarian regime. Indian exports and tourism earnings began to fall sharply, highlighting popular discontent with India's role in propping up Hasina’s regime.
While the “India Out” movement gained traction in the wake of India’s strong backing for Hasina’s reelection, the underlying discontent with India had been building for years. Many Bangladeshis were aggrieved by a host of issues, including the killing of civilians by India’s Border Security Force (BSF), a lack of reciprocity in sharing water from common rivers like the Teesta, dehumanising remarks about Bangladeshis accused of illegal migration, and perceived hypocrisy regarding the rights of religious minorities.
Though Hasina’s ignominious exit is forcing India to rethink its Bangladesh policy, a clear divide remains among Indian politicians and analysts. Many continue to dismiss the uprising against Hasina as the work of Islamist forces or part of a larger conspiracy, while others express concern that India’s political establishment, regardless of party affiliation, is seen as trying to undermine the Bangladeshi people's desire for democracy, rule of law, and justice. Accusations of harbouring Hasina, spreading misinformation, and inciting communal tensions along the border have only added to these perceptions.
Perhaps one of India’s gravest policy missteps was its endorsement of three flawed elections in Bangladesh, ignoring the democratic aspirations of 170 million Bangladeshis and dismissing their disenfranchisement. India’s nonchalant response to the growing anti-government movement was met with strong criticism from the new interim government’s chief advisor, Professor Yunus. Expressing disappointment with India’s stance, Yunus said he was particularly disheartened by the dismissive attitude towards the protests, which India framed as an internal affair of Bangladesh. “If there is a fire in the brother’s house, how can I say it is an internal affair?” Yunus asked in an interview with The Indian Express. He later warned NDTV that destabilising Bangladesh would have spillover effects on neighbouring regions, including Myanmar and India’s northeastern states.
India’s unwavering loyalty to the Awami League and its dynastic leadership has not only necessitated a re-evaluation of its Bangladesh policy but has also drawn attention from the United States. Washington, once again, may be realising that giving India a free hand in its backyard will not always yield the desired outcomes. According to reports by The Washington Post, several U.S. State Department officials, including the former U.S. Ambassador to Bangladesh, had advocated for stronger action to ensure a free and fair election in Bangladesh, but this strategy was reportedly derailed by lobbying efforts from Indian security advisers.
At one point, the Biden administration appeared ready to mend ties with the Hasina government despite tensions over election-related issues. In May, Donald Lu, the U.S. official responsible for South Asia, visited Dhaka and emphasised that the U.S. wanted to rebuild trust with the Bangladeshi people while reinforcing the country’s democratic governance. Lu returned again in September to lead an interagency delegation aimed at strengthening financial stability and democratic governance, announcing an additional $200 million in U.S. aid to promote inclusive growth and democracy in Bangladesh. This move reflected Washington’s awareness of the risks inherent in supporting autocratic regimes under its Indo-Pacific strategy.
The recent meeting between President Biden and Dr. Yunus on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York marked a symbolic reset in U.S.-Bangladesh relations, as it was the first such meeting with a Bangladeshi leader in recent memory.
China, too, has quickly adapted to the changing political dynamics in Bangladesh. Despite previously backing Hasina and even inviting her to visit Beijing after her controversial election victory, China is now signalling a readiness to work with the interim government. While India’s diplomacy had previously blocked some of Beijing’s ambitions, such as the construction of a deep-sea port, China remains eager to maintain its influence under the new leadership. It is likely that Beijing will continue to push for Bangladesh's participation in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), though with a recalibrated approach.
Russia, another of Hasina’s staunch allies, is similarly facing a reassessment of its Bangladesh strategy. For years, Moscow has accused the U.S. of meddling in Bangladesh’s domestic politics, framing calls for free elections as a disguised effort at regime change. Russian officials, including Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, even alleged that the U.S. was behind the planning of opposition rallies against Hasina. Historically, Bangladesh’s relations with Russia have fluctuated, warming significantly under Awami League governments, especially due to Russian support during Bangladesh’s 1971 war of independence, which aligned with India’s strategic interests.
During Hasina’s first term in office, she procured MiG-29 fighter jets from Russia, and trade relations between Dhaka and Moscow flourished during her subsequent terms, as Bangladesh engaged Russia in large infrastructure projects, including the construction of the Rooppur nuclear power plant. Now, under a new administration, many of these projects may come under review.
The dramatic downfall of Sheikh Hasina has upended South Asia’s geopolitical landscape, forcing regional and global powers—especially India, the U.S., China, and Russia—to reevaluate their policies toward Bangladesh. India, in particular, now finds itself in a precarious position, forced to recalibrate its strategy while grappling with the rising tide of anti-India sentiment across its eastern neighbour.
(Published in The New Age’s 21st anniversary special supplement on October 10, 2024.)
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